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Abusing the Authority of the
State: Denying Foreign Official
Immunity for Egregious Human
Rights Abuses
Beth Stephens*

ABSTRACT

Government officials accused of human rights abuses often
claim that they are protected by state immunity because only the
state can be held responsible for acts committed by its officials.
This claim to immunity is founded on two interrelatederrors.
First, the post-World War II human rights transformation of
international law has rendered obsolete the view that a state
can protect its own officials from accountability for human
rights violations. Second, officials can be held individually
responsible for their own actions even when internationallaw
also holds the states liable for those acts. This Article begins
with an analysis of U.S. foreign official immunity norms after
the Supreme Court decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278 (2010). Based on a review of the historical roots of state
and official immunity and the impact of modern human rights
law on the principles underlying foreign official immunity, the
Article then argues that both logic and policy support denying
immunity to officials even if the state itself is granted immunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In a pattern repeated multiple times throughout 2011, tens of
thousands of citizens gathered peacefully to protest the repressive
actions of unelected governments. Senior government leaders ordered
state officials to detain and torture the protesters or to shoot into
unarmed crowds. The domestic legal systems, controlled by the
regimes in each of these countries, provided no means by which those
injured could seek redress or those responsible could be held
accountable. The few international tribunals offered little or no relief
because of their limited mandates and limited resources.
After being stymied elsewhere, victims and survivors of these
massive abuses are likely to seek justice in other countries. But if the
domestic courts of a foreign state seek to hold accountable
government officials responsible for human rights abuses, those
officials will inevitably claim immunity from criminal prosecution or
civil lawsuits. They will argue that they are protected by the state's
own immunity because only the state can be held responsible for acts
committed by its officials, even if those actions violate international
law.
This claim to immunity is founded on two interrelated errors,
one based in history and one in logic. First, the human rights
transformation of international law that began in the aftermath of
World War II has also transformed immunity law. International
human rights norms have rendered obsolete the view that a state can
protect its own officials from accountability for international human
rights violations. Second, immunity absolutists err when they insist
that, because the state is responsible under international law for acts
committed in the exercise of governmental authority, logic dictates
that the officials who commit such acts must be protected by the
state's immunity.
In the United States, the international law principles underlying
official immunity have new relevance in the wake of the 2010
Supreme Court decision in Samantar v. Yousuf.i As explained in Part

II, Samantar held that the immunity of foreign officials is governed
by the common law, not by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
1.

Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
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(FSIA). 2 The post-Samantar common law will likely look, in part, to
international law. To provide context for an understanding of the
international doctrines governing official immunity, Part III reviews
the historical roots of both state and official immunity, explaining
how each has evolved to reflect significant changes in international
law and foreign relations. Part IV explores the transformative impact
of modern human rights law on the principles underlying foreign
official immunity. In the era of international human rights norms
that override conflicting domestic laws, foreign officials who commit
egregious abuses cannot shelter behind the immunity of the state.3
Finally, as explained in Part V, both logic and policy support
holding both states and their officials responsible for international
human rights violations and denying immunity to officials even if the
state itself is granted immunity. The policies underlying the various
categories of immunity differ, and offering immunity to one actor does
not require immunizing others. States themselves are governed by
immunity rules that rest on comity and the requirements of
diplomacy. Similar policies underlie the personal immunities granted
to certain high-ranking officials, including heads of state and
diplomats, while they are in office. 4 The functional immunities of
state officials serve more limited purposes that are outweighed by the
policies reflected in international human rights norms.
The category of human rights violations that should not receive
immunity might be defined by different terms, including
international crimes, jus cogens violations, violations that trigger
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and egregious or core human rights
violations. These different terms are not interchangeable, and some
commentators emphasize and rely on the distinctions.5 I intentionally

2.
Id. at 2289-92 (interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2006)).
3.
Although similar principles should deny domestic law immunity to
government officials who commit egregious human rights abuses, far too many states
refuse to hold their own officials accountable. Domestic immunity, however, is beyond
the scope of this article.
4.
Personal immunity, or immunity ratione personae, provides broad
immunity for persons holding certain government positions, including heads of state
and diplomats, while functional immunity, or immunity ratione materiae, refers to
immunity that covers particular acts of state officials. See Chim~ne I. Keitner, The
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 61, 63-66 (2010)
(defining and applying the terms).
5.
See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials,
International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 832-38,
840-41 (2011) (rejecting argument that immunity cannot apply to violations of jus
cogens norms, but arguing against immunity for international violations that trigger
extraterritorial jurisdiction); see also Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of
Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2709 (2011) (discussing, in the
U.S. context, using the term "Sosa norms" to refer to the clearly defined, widely
accepted norms defined in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), and arguing
that violations of those norms do not trigger common law immunity).
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use the broadest terms, egregious or core human rights violations, to
make a broader point. International human rights norms
fundamentally altered the relationship between international law
and domestic human rights violations. Government officials have no
claim to immunity in foreign or international courts for acts in
violation of those norms.

II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POST-SAMANTAR
COMMON LAW OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976, only a handful of
reported U.S. cases considered whether foreign officials who were not
protected by personal immunity were nevertheless immune from
suits arising out of acts taken in the exercise of governmental
authority. 6 Where the lawsuits would have required some action by
the foreign government-payment of funds or other injunctive reliefthe courts generally recognized immunity. For example, in Heaney v.
Government of Spain,7 the court granted immunity to a foreign
official because the case sought to enforce a contract against the
foreign state.8
In other cases, however, the courts generally denied immunity,
reasoning that, in suits against officials as individuals, the fact that
the defendants exercised governmental authority did not render them
immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.9 These decisions
were generally consistent with the approach adopted by the 1965
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which stated that
immunity extended to a foreign official "with respect to acts

6.
For further analysis of these cases, see Keitner, supra note 4, at 67-69;
Chimbne I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE
J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Officially Immune]. In a
forthcoming publication, Professor Keitner discusses additional, previously overlooked
cases from the 1790s that confirm that foreign officials were not generally granted
immunity from suit in U.S. courts. Chim~ne I. Keitner, The Lost History of Foreign
Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
7.
Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1971).
8.
Id. at 504 ("[Tjhe effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule
of law against the state.. .. ") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF THE FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 66(f) (1965) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Oliner v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 429, 434 (App. Div.
1970) (recognizing immunity because a government agency was the real party in
interest).
9.
See, e.g., Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 308-09 (N.D. Cal. 1929) (denying
immunity because the state was not the real party in interest and the officer had acted
"in excess of his authority or under void authority"); Pilger v. U.S. Steel Corp., 130 A.
523, 524 (N.J. 1925) (denying immunity because the public official had acted
unlawfully).
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performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction
would be to enforce a rule of law against the state."1 0
The FSIA codified the immunity of foreign states but made no
mention of foreign official immunity. A majority of the circuit courts
interpreted the FSIA as covering officials, but, consistent with the
U.S. approach to domestic official immunity, held that immunity
applied only to acts within an official's lawful authority." As a result,
the courts denied immunity in cases alleging egregious human rights
abuses. 12
Despite the majority support in the circuits, application of the
FSIA to individual government officials was a stretch: the statute
made no mention of officials; the Executive Branch consistently
maintained that it did not address officials; and the legislative history
gave no indication that Congress had considered official immunity.' 3
In 2010, in Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that the FSIA did not apply to foreign officials. 14 The
Court made clear, however, that foreign officials might nevertheless
be entitled to nonstatutory immunity, stating that "in some
circumstances the immunity of the foreign state extends to an
individual for acts taken in his official capacity."' 5
The Samantar opinion offered little guidance as to the substance
of the common law immunity that attaches to some officials "in some
circumstances."' 6 Courts and commentators seeking to develop rules
governing common law immunity are likely to look at international
law for. guidance.' 7 The following two parts offer an overview of that

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
10.
STATES § 66(f) (1965). The Restatement (Second) has been superseded by the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
See,. e.g., Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir.
11.
1990) (holding that a Philippine government official was entitled to immunity "for acts
committed in his official capacity," but not for "acts beyond the scope of his authority").
For additional cases, see Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.4 (2010).
See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights
12.
Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (no immunity for acts of torture); Trajano v.
Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir.
1992) (same).
Samanter, 130 S. Ct. at 2286-91.
13.
14.
Id. at 2292.
Id. at 2290-92. ("Even if a suit is not governed by the Act, it may still be
15.
barred by foreign sovereign immunity under the common law.").
16.
Id.
17.
See id. at 2289 (stating that one purpose of the FSIA was "codification of
international law at the time of the FSIA's enactment"); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 27, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010) (No. 08-1555) ("[Flidelity to international norms [is an] important factor[] that
the Executive Branch considers in determining whether to suggest immunity for
particular foreign officials."). As I have explained elsewhere, courts developing common
law immunity principles will find the most useful guidance in the extensive U.S.
jurisprudence holding that foreign officials can be held accountable for violations of
widely accepted, clearly defined international human rights norms. Stephens, supra
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law, beginning in Part III with a brief history that explains the lack
of international consensus about the reach of foreign official
immunity. Part IV then addresses the dramatic impact of human
rights law on the principles underlying foreign official immunity.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY:
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

International law governing immunity has reached consensus on
the application of immunity to only a small set of international
actors. No widely ratified international agreements establish the
framework for foreign immunity. A broad treaty, finalized in 2004,
has only twelve state parties and has yet to come into force.1 8 Narrow
treaties afford personal immunity to diplomats, consular officials, and
members of certain special missions,1 9 while customary international
law recognizes the personal immunity of sitting heads of state and
foreign ministers.2 0 The lack of international agreement as to other
immunities leaves states to determine their immunity doctrine
through domestic law. But few states have statutes governing foreign
immunity, and those statutes rarely mention the immunities of
officials. 2 1 States often look to international law for guidance, but just
as often arrive at different understandings of its substance.

note 5, at 2704-10. Courts will likely also look to domestic immunity principles and
pre-FSIA immunity decisions. Id. at 2685-704.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
18.
Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc A159/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UN
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities], will come into force when ratified by thirty
states. Id. art. 30. For the status of ratifications, see Status: United Nations Convention
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY&mtdsgno=III13&chapter-3&lang-en (last updated Oct. 15, 2011).
19.
See Convention on Special Missions, Dec. 8, 1969, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231;
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
20.
See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.

3, 20-24 (Feb. 14).
In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, Argentina,
21.
Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa have enacted immunity
statutes. ANDREW DICKINSON ET AL., STATE IMMUNITY: SELECTED MATERIALS AND

COMMENTARY 329-442, 461-522 (2004). Fox mentions that Malaysia and Malawi also
have immunity statutes, as do "other small common law jurisdictions" such as St.
Kitts. HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 201 n.1 (2d ed. 2008). The Australian
statute appears to be unique in explicitly discussing the immunity of natural persons
aside from heads of state. See Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) art. 22 (Austl.)
(stating that the statute applies to a "separate entity of a foreign State"); id. art. 3
(defining "separate entity" to include natural persons); Mizushima Tomonori, The
Individual as Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problemsof the Attribution of Ultra Vires
Conduct, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 261, 264-65 (2001) (explaining that the
Australian statute's explicit mention of immunity for natural persons is exceptional).
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The lack of consensus on key issues of foreign state immunity
reflects the absence of agreed upon historical foundations. The
customary international law recognition of immunity as a bar to the
jurisdiction of foreign states developed during the nineteenth
century. 22 Legal historians trace the doctrine to the personal
inviolability of absolute monarchs and to the practical reality that
friendly relations required that ambassadors and diplomats travel
unimpeded.2 3 The recognition of state immunity carried a price,
because immunity constitutes an exception to a state's authority over
people and things within its territory. 24 The classic Supreme Court
decision on sovereign immunity, The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon,25 articulated this tension, recognizing immunity as a
limited exception to territorial jurisdiction. 26 Even during immunity's
high point in the nineteenth century, states continued to claim the
right to assert territorial jurisdiction, but recognized specific
exceptions in which they would grant immunity.2 7
The tension produced by the competing demands of jurisdiction
and immunity has triggered repeated modifications of immunity
doctrines. In the twentieth century, as states increasingly engaged in
commercial activities, many states adopted what is now known as the
"restrictive theory," which denies immunity to foreign states for

22.
(1970).

THEODORE R. GIuTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 3

23.

Id. at 7-8 & 7 n.5; Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Competence of Courts in

Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENT 451, 473, 527 (1932) (draft

convention with reporter commentary).
GIUTTARI, supra note 22, at 6-7 & n.4 (quoting 1 CHARLES C. HYDE,
24.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 815-16 (2d ed. 1945)); see also Rosalyn Higgins, Certain
Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 265, 271
(1982) ("It is sovereign immunity which is the exception to jurisdiction and not
jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of immunity."); Stacy Humes-Schulz,
Note, Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human Rights, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
105, 135 (2008) (same).
25.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
26.
In an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court noted that "[tihe
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." Id. at 136. The view that
immunity is a voluntary ceding of territorial jurisdiction remains the law of the United
States, which views immunity as "a matter of grace and comity." Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens:
27.
A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 749-55 (2003)
(analyzing history of state immunity and concluding that states retain the sovereign
authority to decide whether or not to grant immunity to other states); Lorna McGregor,
Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 903, 914-15 (2007) (discussing the historical flexibility of immunity doctrine
and its status as an exception to territorial sovereignty); Jane Wright, Retribution but
No Recompense: A Critique of the Torturer's Immunity from Civil Suit, 30 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 143, 157-59 (2010) (explaining that international law supports state
authority to assert jurisdiction in the absence of specific immunity rules to the
contrary).

1170

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:1163

commercial acts. 28 The new doctrine was controversial, as the
socialist states insisted that, in their political-economic structures,
such acts were public, not private, and were therefore entitled to
immunity.2 9 But the majority of states nevertheless adopted the new
approach without seeking international agreement or authorization. 30
The adoption of the restrictive theory, which is now the dominant
approach to state immunity, 3 ' reflects the flexibility of immunity
doctrines, and the international community's ability to adjust
immunity norms to respond to new legal and economic developments.
In some circumstances, states extend the immunity that they
grant to each other to foreign officials who act on behalf of a foreign
state. But individuals are different from states in ways that impact
immunity. Officials are separate legal entities, so claims against
them do not necessarily implicate the state. The state need not defend
or indemnify officials who are sued or held criminally responsibleand may even denounce an official's actions.32 Officials eventually
finish their terms and sever their ties with the state. They may also
leave their home state, placing themselves within the territorial
jurisdiction of another state. Perhaps most important, individuals
have agency or moral choice: they have the option of choosing
whether to comply with state policies.
Perhaps as a result of these differences, the international
doctrine governing foreign official immunity is even less settled than
the immunity governing the state itself. The few early domestic court
decisions that addressed the immunity of foreign officials reflect a
hesitation to cede power over persons within the forum state's
territory. In a 1932 Polish case described by Mizushima Tomonori, for
example, a Polish customs officer was denied immunity for activities
arising out of his state employment.33 Similarly, a 1945 Irish decision
GIUTTARI, supra note 22, at 3-4. The United States adopted the restrictive
28.
doctrine in 1952 and largely codified it in the FSIA. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486-89
(summarizing this history).
See Caplan, supra note 27, at 749 (noting that, under socialist theory,
29.
politics and trade are both public functions of the socialist state and therefore equally
entitled to sovereign immunity).
McGregor, supra note 27, at 915.
30.
FOX, supra note 21, at 201 (noting a "wide and ever increasing," but not
31.
universal, support for the restrictive doctrine).
In the modern U.S. civil litigation for human rights abuses, for example,
32.
foreign governments generally have not chosen to defend or indemnify their former
officials. Some governments actually waive the former officials' immunity. Most remain
silent. In cases in which plaintiffs collected damages awards from defendants, the
governments have not indemnified the officials. See BETH STEPHENS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 533-34 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing judgments in human rights cases); id. at 383-84 (discussing waivers of
immunity); Stephens, supra note 5, at 2681-82, 2716-17 (discussing foreign
governments' role in U.S. litigation against their former officials and noting that the
governments generally do not attempt to defend their officials' actions).
33.
Polish Officials in Danzig case, 6 Ann. Dig. 130 (High Ct. 1932), discussed
in Tomonori, supra note 21, at 266-67. For additional analysis of the cases discussed in
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refused to grant immunity to a Spanish official sued for breach of
contract with his government. 34 The court noted that "no relief is
sought against any person save the appellant. He is sued in his
personal capacity and the judgment ... will bind merely the
appellant personally, and ... cannot be enforced against any property
save that of the appellant."35 The court stated that no rule of
international law authorized a claim of immunity for foreign officials
"[w]here the Sovereign is not named as a party and where there is no
claim against him for damages or otherwise, and where no relief is
sought against his person or his property . . ."36
Other decisions did recognize foreign official immunity, although
most often in cases in which a judgment against the individual would,
in effect, constitute a judgment against the state itself. In Twycross v.
Dreyfus, decided in 1877, a UK court dismissed a suit against
companies acting as agents of the government of Peru because Peru
was a necessary party in a dispute over the proceeds from the sale of
property owned by Peru.3 7 Similarly, in a 1958 case, Rahimtoola v.
Nizam of Hyderabad,38 the House of Lords found that a suit against
the former High Commissioner of Pakistan was barred by sovereign
immunity because it required determining Pakistan's entitlement to
funds held in a London bank account. 39 In both of these cases, the
concern "was to ensure that the proper defendant was before the
court .... In other words, it is not a case of the official availing
himself of the State's immunities, but rather of his not being the
40
proper defendant to the action before the court."
As reflected in this brief overview, both state immunity and
official immunity are dynamic doctrines that states have adapted to
meet their changing needs. Rules initially devised to protect foreign
monarchs evolved to cover the state itself. When states began to
engage in widespread commercial activities, the states adjusted the
rules to limit immunity for those acts. By comparison, the functional
immunities of foreign officials are largely undefined. The history
reviewed here illustrates that, to the extent that a rule of customary
international law developed in the mid-twentieth century, the most
that can be concluded is that this rule granted immunity to officials
in cases in which a judgment would run against the state.

this section, see Chimbne I. Keitner, Annotated Brief of Professors of Public
InternationalLaw and ComparativeLaw as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in
Samantar v. Yousuf, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 101, 115-16 (2011); Keitner, Officially
Immune?, supranote 6, at 4-5; Tomonori, supra note 21, at 266-73.
Saorstat & Cont'1 S.S. Co. v. De las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, 300 (Ir.).
34.
35.
Id.
Id. at 300-03.
36.
Twycross v. Dreyfus, [1877] 5 Ch.D. 605 (C.A.) (Eng.).
37.
38.
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (H.L.) (Eng.).
39.
C. A. Whomersley, Some Reflections on the Immunity of Individuals for
Official Acts, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848, 850 (1992).
40.
Id.
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As explained in Part IV, the development of international human
rights norms in the late twentieth century, followed by efforts to hold
accountable those who violated those norms, transformed
international law and triggered a significant response in the law
governing foreign official immunity. As Harold Koh wrote over twenty
years ago, once the restrictive doctrine had authorized the denial of
immunity for claims arising out of commercial transactions, "the
persistent question arose, 'if contracts, why not torture?"41

IV. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sovereign immunity developed at a time when international law
generally disclaimed the right to judge the lawfulness of a state's
treatment of its own citizens within its borders. International
recognition of the rights of individuals vis-a-vis their own
governments solidified after World War II, when the United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and drafted a
series of multilateral human rights treaties, most of which came into
effect in the 1970s and the following decades. 4 2 A core group of
human rights obligations are now jus cogens norms, binding on all
states. 43
The development of international human rights norms had a
dramatic impact on official immunity because those norms override
domestic authority. International law now imposes limits on state
officials, declaring certain acts to be unlawful even if permitted by
domestic law. This transformation took root in the criminal
prosecutions after World War II, as enunciated in what may be the
most famous principle of the Nuremberg Tribunal: "Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced." 44 Although widely

41.
Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2365 (1991). Koh added, "If American courts could subject the commercial
conduct of foreign sovereigns to legal scrutiny without offending comity, why should
comity immunize that same sovereign from judicial examination of its egregious public
conduct?" Id.
42.
For an overview of international human rights law after World War II, see
Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 64-75 (1981).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
43.
STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) (defining jus cogens norms as rules of international law
"recognized by the international community of states as peremptory, permitting no
derogation").
The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int'l Military Trib. at Nuremberg
44.

1946).
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45
accepted by the international community, for several decades the
deep divisions reflected in the Cold War stymied efforts to hold
foreign states and their officials accountable for international
crimes. 46 However, as detailed below, beginning with civil lawsuits in
the United States in the 1980s and continuing with international
criminal tribunals and domestic criminal prosecutions in the 1990s,
immunity law has begun to adapt to the now-dominant human rights
paradigm.
Given that jus cogens norms are binding on all states and
override conflicting obligations, some commentators argue that jus
cogens human rights obligations override state immunity: "The
prohibition of torture, being a rule of jus cogens . .. deprives the rule
47
of sovereign immunity of all its legal effects." The Italian Court of
Cassation adopted this "normative hierarchy" approach in 2008 in a
series of lawsuits arising out of World War 11.48 The court denied
immunity to Germany because "international crimes are prohibited
by peremptory norms of international law, which are higher in rank
and prevail over any other rules," including the rules of state

See Intl Law Comm'n, Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized in the
45.
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, princs. 1-4,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (1950) [hereinafter Nurnberg Principles] (by Ricardo J. Alfaro),
reprinted in Summary Records of the Second Session, [19501 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 28,
33-48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950 (stating that any person who commits an
international crime can be held responsible under international law, regardless of
whether the accused is a government official or acted pursuant to government orders).
46.
Catherine Turner, Human Rights and the Empire of (International)Law,
29 L. & INEQUALITY 313, 316 (2011) ("The precedent set at Nuremberg was effectively
frozen in its own historical moment as a result of increasing Cold War tensions, not to
re-emerge until decades later.').
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 111-12 (2001)
47.
(Rozakis & Calfisch, JJ., dissenting). For commentary arguing that human rights
obligations trump state immunity, see Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment: Implied
Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory
Norms of InternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 390-91 (1989); Caplan, supra note
27, at 757-69, 776-80; McGregor, supra note 27, at 916-17; see also Akande & Shah,
supra note 5, at 817, 839-46 (rejecting the normative hierarchy approach, but arguing
that recently developed norms permitting extraterritorial jurisdiction have displaced
pre-existing immunity rules).
See generally Carlo Focarelli, Federal Republic of Germany v. Giovanni
48.
Mantelli and Others, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 122, 124-25 (2009) (explaining Italian court
holding that the "higher-ranking" international rule prohibiting crimes against
humanity barred granting immunity for such acts).
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immunity. 49 In a case raising similar issues, Greek courts also
refused to accord immunity to Germany.50
Aside from the Italian and Greek decisions, efforts to recognize a
broad human rights exception to state immunity have been largely
unsuccessful. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., refused to read such an exception into
the FSIA. 5 ' In Al-Adsani v. Kuwait, the United Kingdom similarly
rejected the argument that international law prohibited granting
immunity to foreign states accused of violations of jus cogens norms. 52
The Al-Adsani holding withstood challenge before the European
Court of Human Rights in a close nine to eight decision.5 3 The
dissenters in the European Court would have adopted the normative
hierarchy theory, arguing that the international jus cogens norm
prohibiting torture overrides the "hierarchically lower rule" of
sovereign immunity. 54 The majority rejected that view, however, and,
in a subsequent case, a broad majority of the European Court
affirmed the Al-Adsani holding.55
In contrast to these largely unsuccessful efforts to hold states
accountable for human rights violations, an expanding body of
scholarly commentary and domestic civil and criminal decisions,
discussed below, indicates that immunity does not bar claims against
49.
Id. at 128. The German government has challenged the Italian decision in
the International Court of Justice. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.
It.), Application Instituting Proceedings, at 4 (Dec. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/14923.pdf. The Court has granted Greece's
application to intervene in the proceedings. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Ger. v. It.), Order, 1 34 (July 4, 2011), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
143/16556.pdf.
50.
Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000 (Greece) (denying immunity
and awarding damages for a German massacre of over 200 Greek civilians),
summarized in Elena Vournas, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany:
Sovereign Immunity and the Exception for Jus Cogens Violations, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 629, 635 (2002). A later Greek decision refused to allow enforcement
of the judgment. Andrea Gattini, To What Extent Are State Immunity and NonJusticiabilityMajor Hurdles to Individuals' Claims for War Damages?, 1 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 348, 356-60 (2003) (explaining the refusal to enforce and the complicated
procedural history of the case).
51.
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989). The FSIA creates an exception for torture and extrajudicial execution only in
cases filed against states on the U.S. list of sponsors of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A
(2006). The list of state sponsors of terrorism currently includes Cuba, Iran, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Prohibited Exports and Sales to Certain Countries, 22 C.F.R.
§ 126.1(d) (2009).
52.
Al-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536 (Q.B.) 541-42 (1996) (Eng.).
53.
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 103 (2001)
(holding that the United Kingdom did not violate the European Convention on Human
Rights when it granted immunity to the government of Kuwait in a case alleging
torture in Kuwait).
54.
Id. at 113-14 (Rozakis & Calfisch, JJ., dissenting).
55.
Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 415, 429 (2002) (holding
that international law does not require that a state enforce against another state a
judgment based on human rights violations).
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foreign officials for egregious abuses. The distinction between the
state and its officials reflects the inescapable difference between the
artificial entity of the state and human beings. Individual officials
have the option of refusing to commit acts that violate international
law, and they bear responsibility for their actions even if following
orders given by the leaders of their government. As stated in the
Nuremberg principles, government officials should be held
responsible for international crimes as long as "a moral choice was in
fact possible."56
As noted above, some commentators suggest that customary
international law prohibits granting foreign officials immunity for
egregious human rights violations. The International Court of Justice
rejected this view, but only in the context of a high-ranking official
entitled to personal immunity. 57 The British House of Lords also
rejected this view in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, a decision that is now
being challenged in the European Court of Human Rights.58 Each of
these decisions involved defendants who were not present in the
jurisdiction where the lawsuit was filed.59
Even if customary international law does not prohibit granting
immunity to officials in cases involving core human rights violations,
the more modest proposition seems clear: there is no customary
international law rule that requires foreign official immunity for
violations of core human rights norms. This is important because
immunity proponents claim that international law requires immunity
and that the only way to override the obligation to grant immunity is
to show that a newly emerged rule has replaced the preexisting
obligation. 60 But the assumption that international law requires

NurnbergPrinciples,supra note 45, at 42-49 princ. 4.
56.
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3,
57.
20-24 (Feb. 14). For discussion of this point, see Akande & Shah, supra note 5, at 841
(noting that international jurisprudence denying personal immunity to current, highranking officials does not necessarily apply to the functional immunity of lower ranking
or former officials).
Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL
58.
26, [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (H.L.) 285-86 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
59.
As Akande and Shah have pointed out, objections to the assertion of
jurisdiction over former officials have involved defendants sued in absentia.Akande &
Shah, supra note 5, at 848-49. Claims against former officials physically present in the
forum state-particularly those residing there-may trigger the territorial jurisdiction
of that state. The U.S. Executive Branch has suggested that presence in the United
States is relevant to the denial of common law immunity under U.S. law. See
Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 9, Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) (stating that Mohamed Ali Samantar was
not entitled to immunity, in part because he resided in the United States). For a
discussion of the relevance of presence in the forum state, see Chim&ne I. Keitner,
Foreign Official Immunity after Samantar, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 837 (2011).
60.
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State
18, 47, 71, U.N.
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int'l Law Comm'n,
Doc. A/CN.4/601 (by Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin). By contrast, Professor Keitner
argues that, at least when claims are filed against foreign officials who are physically
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immunity is not justified by the limited state practice addressing
official immunity prior to the rise of the human rights movement,
given that only a handful of decisions from a few states, scattered
over two centuries, have been analyzed, and none of those cases
involved egregious human rights violations. As Rosalyn Higgins
pointed out in a 1982 discussion of the restrictive doctrine, immunity
proponents bear the burden of demonstrating that international law
requires immunity in particular circumstances. 6 1 As "an exception to
the normal rules of jurisdiction[, immunity] should only be granted
when international law requires-that is to say, when it is consonant
with justice and with the equitable protection of the parties. It is not
granted 'as of right."' 62
. Moreover, significant scholarly commentary and state practice
now support the denial of immunity in the face of egregious violations
of international law. First, international commentary reflects
increasing recognition for the conclusion that that states must deny
immunity in criminal prosecutions for core human rights violations.
In 2009, the Institute of International Law declared that "persons
who act on behalf of a State" are not entitled to conduct-based
immunity when charged with international crimes.6 3 Hazel Fox, in
her influential book on immunity, acknowledged that customary
international law permits criminal prosecution of former officials in
some circumstances. 64 State practice reflects a growing rejection of
immunity from criminal prosecution in cases alleging egregious
human rights violations.65 In one recent example, a Spanish judge
filed criminal charges against Salvadoran military officials for the

present in the territory of the forum state, international law presumes that the forum
state has jurisdiction and requires that immunity proponents justify an exception to
that presumption. Chimbne I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity and the "Baseline"
Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
Higgins, supra note 24, at 271.
61.
Id.
62.
Institute of Int'l Law, Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdictionof the
63.
State and of Persons Who Act on Behalfof the State in Case of InternationalCrimes art.
111(1) (2009) (by Lady Fox), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009
naples_01en.pdf. Hazel Fox served as the rapporteur in drafting the resolution, id.,
which defines "international crimes" as "serious crimes under international law such as
genocide, crimes against humanity, torture and war crimes," id. art. I(1).
64.
FOX, supra note 21, at 52 ("With reasonable certainty it can be stated that
international law permits the criminal prosecution of former State officials (other than
head of State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs . . .) by national courts having some
jurisdictional link, such as the place of commission of the offence or the nationality or
habitual residence of the alleged offender."). Fox also recognized that "contemporary
morality" mandates that "individual officials enjoy no impunity for torture, even if
carried out on State orders." Id. at 21.
65.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
184-87, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar.
Jurisdiction:Memorandum by the Secretariat,
31, 2008); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, InternationalLaw and the
U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 238-40 & nn.
124-36 (listing cases).

201II

ABUSING THEAUTHORITYOF THE STATE

177

murder in El Salvador of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and
her daughter."6
Second, a well-developed line of civil cases, primarily in the
United States, rejects immunity for violations of clearly defined,
widely accepted human rights norms. 67 In a case against Imee
Marcos-Manotoc, daughter of former Philippine dictator Ferdinand
Marcos, for instance, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim of immunity
because the human rights abuses were "beyond the scope of her
authority," and involved "doing something the sovereign has not
empowered the official to do." 68 Similarly, in a class action against
Ferdinand Marcos's estate, the court held that the alleged "acts of
torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts outside of his
authority as President," and that "acts [that] were not taken within
any official mandate" did not trigger immunity. 69 "[T]he illegal acts of
a dictator," the court concluded, "are not 'official acts' unreviewable
by federal courts."70
Judges and commentators increasingly recognize that a rule
denying immunity for criminal prosecutions would apply equally to
civil claims. Thus, Justice Stephen Breyer has noted that civil claims
are less intrusive than criminal prosecutions. 7' Others see no
significant difference between the two.72 Perhaps most persuasive,
the line between civil and criminal jurisdiction is drawn differently in
different legal systems, and the two are often intertwined.73 For
example, in Milde v. Bottcher, an Italian court ordered a German
official convicted of human rights abuses during World War II to pay
damages to the victims, who had intervened in the criminal
proceedings.74 As a result, as Fox concludes, "the effect of [denying

66.
See Elisabeth Malkin, From Spain, Charges Against 20 in the Killing of 6
Priests in El Salvador in 1989, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A4 (reporting that a
Spanish judge had issued arrest warrants for twenty Salvadoran military leaders,
accusing them of planning and carrying out the killings in 1989).
67.
The U.S. cases are based on the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006),
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725
(2004) (holding that the ATS grants jurisdiction over claims based on clearly defined,
widely accepted international law norms).
68.
Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d
493, 497 (9th Cir. 1992).
69.
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25
F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994).
70.
Id. at 1471.
71.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762-63 (Breyer, J., concurring).
72.
See Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction,supra note 60, 88; Fox, supra note 21, at 750; Akande & Shah,
supra note 5, at 851-52; Wright, supra note 27, at 152-53.
73.
See Beth Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International
Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 17-21, 44-45 (2002); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762-63 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
74.
Trib. Militare Spezia, 10 ottobre 2006, n. 49 (It.), summarized in Annalisa
Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over Germany in a
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immunity in criminal prosecutions] will be to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction by national courts in respect of civil proceedings as well
as criminal."7 5
The scope of foreign official immunity was debated in the
negotiations that led to the adoption of the text of the Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities, which was finalized in 2004 but is not in
force.76 During the drafting process, negotiators rejected a specific
statement that immunity should not apply to claims of human rights
violations7 7 because a formal exception for serious human rights
violations was "not ripe enough" for codification.7 8 However, Fox
suggests that the Convention's failure to include a human rights
exception is outdated and may not capture current customary
international law, because much of the work on the Convention was
completed in 1991 and therefore predated major shifts in the relevant
international law.79
In the face of growing international rejection of immunity for
core human rights abuses, immunity absolutists argue that logic
requires that officials who commit acts in the exercise of state
authority must be protected by the immunity of the state. Part V
addresses this argument and the terminology that is partly
responsible for confusion about the logic or illogic of the underlying
claims.

Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War: The Civitella Case, 7 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 597, 597-98 (2009). The judgment also held Germany jointly and severally liable
for the damages. Id. at 598.
75.
Fox, supra note 21, at 750.
76.
See supra note 18.
77.
See Christopher Keith Hall, U.N. Convention on State Immunity: The Need
for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 411, 412 (2006) (discussing the
debate over proposals to include a human rights exception).
The Convention defined a state as including "representatives of the State acting in
that capacity," UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities, supra note 18, art.
2(1)(b)(iv), which may limit its reach to the high-ranking officials who represent the
state in its relationships with other governments. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n,
43d Sess., Apr. 29-July 19, 1991, at 18, U.N. Dc. A/46/10, GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp.
No. 10 (1991) (stating that the provision referred to "all the natural persons who are
authorized to represent the State," including "sovereigns and heads of State," and
"heads of Government, heads of ministerial departments, ambassadors, heads of
mission, diplomatic agents and consular officers, in their representative capacity," and
that actions against the "directors or permanent representatives" of government
departments or against the "agents of a foreign Government" in respect of their official
acts "are essentially proceedings against the State they represent").
78.
Fox, supra note 21, at 140 (citing Chairman's report); Lorna McGregor,
State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437, 437 (2006) (noting that it
would have been "premature" to address immunity and jus cogens norms in the
Convention, because the area of law was in "a state of flux").
79.
FOx, supra note 21, at 3-4. After discussing the ongoing controversy over
the treaty's failure to explicitly exclude immunity for jus cogens violations, Fox
concluded that the treaty may only set a common international standard for "private
law and commercial transactions," not for violations of jus cogens norms. Id.
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V. HUmAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
AND FOREIGN OFFICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Proponents of immunity for foreign officials accused of human

rights violations often rely on a logical construct which asserts that,
because all acts in the exercise of governmental authority are
attributed to the state, the officials who perform those acts are
entitled to the same immunity as the state itself.8 0 But this approach
mistakenly views state responsibility as precluding individual
responsibility, an anachronistic approach that has been rejected by
international law at least since the post-World War II Nuremberg
Tribunals, and is contrary to the state practice described in Part IV.
state-responsibility-must-equal-official-immunity
Moreover,
the
approach is based on two erroneous assumptions: (1) that only a state
can be held liable for an act attributed to the state; and (2) that if a
state is protected by immunity, then state officials must be as well.
To the contrary, both the state and the official can be held responsible
for an act committed in the exercise of state authority, and an official
can be denied immunity even if the state is deemed to be immune.8 1
International law governing responsibility for violations of
human rights norms rests on the important premise that states are
responsible for the acts of their officials, even if those officials violate
international law. The International Law Commission (ILC) Articles
on State Responsibility mandate that states bear responsibility for all
acts committed in the exercise of governmental authority, even if

80.
See, e.g., Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
94(b). The report concluded that officials must
Criminal Jurisdiction,supra note 60,
be immune for acts performed in an official capacity, "since these are acts of the State
which they serve itself." The report indicated that the author saw no other option:
There can scarcely be grounds for asserting that one and the same act of an
official is, for the purposes of State responsibility, attributed to the State and
considered to be its act, and, for the purposes of immunity from jurisdiction, is
not attributed as such and is considered to be only the act of an official.
Id.
94(c). Although strongly defending this conclusion, he notes that there is "no
unanimity" on this. Id. at 16 n.59.
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith made an analogous point prior to the Samantar
decision. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 13 (2009)
("Since a state acts through individuals, a suit against an individual official for actions
carried out on behalf of the state is in reality a suit against the foreign state . . . ."). The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the immunity of foreign officials is
not identical to that of the foreign state. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290
(2010).
81.
For a similar discussion of the logic underlying a rule that denies immunity
to state officials even if the state is considered to be immune, in the context of the
FSIA, see Keitner, Officially Immune?, supra note 6, at 3-6 (stating that in some
instances international law holds officials liable "precisely because they act under the
color of law").
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those acts are unlawful and even if ultra vires.82 That is, the conduct
of "a person . . . empowered to exercise elements of the governmental

authority shall be considered an act of the State under international
law .. . even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions."83
However, those same principles stress that the individual who
commits the wrongful act is responsible as well. The rules of state
responsibility "are without prejudice to any question of the individual
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf
of a State."84 The ILC Commentary explains that recognizing the
legal responsibility of the state "is not to deny the elementary fact
that the State cannot act of itself."85 As a result, "[a]n 'act of the
State' must involve some action or omission by a human being or
group: 'States can act only by and through their agents and
representatives. "'86

The Commentary makes the principle of dual responsibility
crystal clear, emphasizing that individual responsibility has been the
rule since the Nuremberg Tribunals,8 7 and concluding that state
officials may not "hide behind the state in respect of their own
responsibility for conduct of theirs which is contrary to rules of
international law which are applicable to them."8 8 Individuals may be
held accountable through criminal prosecution and perhaps through
civil proceedings as well.89
Individual accountability is also mandated by modern
international human rights norms. This was precisely the point of the

82.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) (Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries).
83.
Id.
84.
Id. art. 57.
85.
Id. art. 2 cmt. 5.
86.
Id. (quoting German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 6, at 22 (Sep. 10)).
87.
Id. art. 58 cmt. 2.
88.
Id. art. 58 cmt. 3. Indeed, punishment of individual wrongdoers may be
part of a state's obligation to provide reparation for a wrongful act. Id. art 58 cmt. 3
n.885.
89.
Id. art. 58 cmt. 2. The Commentary does not specify whether the wrongful
conduct could be "attributed" to both the individual officials and the state, or whether
it views attribution and responsibility as separate issues. The key point, however, is
that neither approach requires that the officials who actually commit unlawful acts be
protected from responsibility for their wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n, 61st Sess., May 4-June 5, July 6-Aug. 7, 2009, at 56, U.N. Doc. A/64/10,
GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2009) (distinguishing between "attribution of conduct"
and "attribution of responsibility"; noting that a party can be held responsible for
conduct even if that conduct is not attributed to it; and recognizing the possibility of
"dual or even multiple attribution of conduct"); Int'l Law Comm'n, Second Report on
Responsibility of InternationalOrganizations,T 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/541 (Apr. 2, 2004)
("[C]onduct does not necessarily have to be attributed exclusively to one subject only.");
id. at 4 ("[J]oint, or joint and several, responsibility does not necessarily depend on
dual attribution."); id. at 6 (responsibility of an actor "does not necessarily rest on
attribution of conduct to that" actor).
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Nuremberg doctrine and of the criminal prosecutions and civil
lawsuits that have become common over the past twenty years. The
fact that acts are committed in the exercise of governmental authority
is not a defense to liability for international crimes. To the contrary,
"individuals commit such crimes by making use (or abuse) of their
official status,"9 0 and lose any claim to immunity when they commit
them. 91
There is no logical inconsistency in recognizing that joint
responsibility can trigger different legal consequences, which are
reflected in different rules as to immunity. Both criminal and civil
liability rules permit one wrongdoer to be held liable even if another,
equally culpable party escapes accountability for some reason.
Immunity absolutists assume that the inherent logic of state
responsibility forecloses this possibility. But, at least since
Nuremberg, international law has punished government officials for
the crimes they commit under the authority of the state.
International and comparative scholarship on immunity often
bogs down in a disagreement about terms that may be mistaken for a
logical disagreement about the legal consequences of unlawful acts
committed in the exercise of state authority. Under longstanding U.S.
law, government officials may be held personally responsible for
injuries caused by their unlawful acts, even if committed in the
exercise of their governmental authority-acts committed "under
color of law" in the domestic U.S. terminology. 92 When those injured
by such acts sue officials in their "personal capacity," they use the
label as a legal term of art to indicate the intent to hold the officials
personally liable for their actions.93 Despite the label, a "personal
capacity" lawsuit does not signify that the challenged acts were
private, but rather that the official should be held personally
responsible for unlawful acts committed under color of law, through
94
the abuse of state authority.

Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for
90.
InternationalCrimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 853, 868 (2002).
Id. at 870-74.
91.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 186 (1961) (stating that acts "under color
92.
of law" are those taken in the use or misuse of power "possessed by virtue of state
law"); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (same).
"When damages are sought from a government official, the officer is
93.
ordinarily sued in a 'personal' or 'individual' capacity. This designation indicates that
any judgment will be assessed against the officer personally, rather than against the
government employer." RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 957 (6th ed. 2009). For a discussion of the history of this concept in
U.S. law, see Stephens, supra note 5, at 2698-702.
By contrast, a lawsuit against an individual in an "official capacity"
94.
indicates that the claim runs directly against the state. "When an official is sued for
damages in an 'official' . . . capacity, . . . the suit will be treated as one against the

official's employer." FALLON, supra note 93, at 958; see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 21
(1991) ("[T]he phrase 'acting in their official capacities' is best understood as a
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Applied to claims alleging violations of international law, this
terminology may seem counterintuitive because many human rights
violations are considered violations of international law precisely
because they are official-not private-acts.9 5 But U.S. law
recognizes that acts for which an individual may be liable are still
committed in the exercise of governmental authority. Despite the
confusion caused by the different terminology, this domestic law
concept is analogous to that advanced by those who seek to hold state
officials personally liable for human rights violations committed in
their official capacity. In both situations, the individual's personal
responsibility for his or her wrongful acts is unaffected by the fact
that the acts involved the use or abuse of state authority or by the
fact that the state as well is responsible for the wrongful acts. 9 6 And
in both situations, a decision to deny immunity to the individual is
separate from whether the state itself is immune-a distinction that
reflects the different policy issues underlying state and official
immunity. Thus, the U.S. approach is consistent with the analysis of
commentators who recognize that international law holds states
responsible for the acts of their officials whether or not those acts are
lawful under international law, but conclude that officials should be
denied immunity for such acts.9 7
Some commentators have called the U.S. approach a "fiction"
because it treats actions taken under color of law as personal acts for
the purposes of immunity.98 But the opposite approach-that only the
state can be held accountable-is equally fictitious. States act
through men and women who have the moral and legal obligation to
choose whether to violate fundamental human rights norms.

reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the
officer inflicts the alleged injury.").
95.
See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114
(defining torture as certain acts "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity").
96.
See Stephens, supra note 5, at 2700 n.188 (citing Karen Lin, Note, An
Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall Act on the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718, 1735-48 (2008) (discussing the
controversial (mis)application of this doctrine to protect U.S. officials from domestic
court liability for egregious misconduct in the aftermath of the attacks on September
11, 2001)); Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day's Work? Scope of Employment,
the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal
Officials, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175, 244-45 (2008) (arguing that U.S.
government immunity should not protect individual officials sued for torture because
such acts are outside the scope of employment).
97.
See, e.g., Akende & Shaw, supra note 5, at 830 (arguing that the sovereign
or official status of act depends not on whether it is legal under international law but
on whether act is "intrinsically governmental," but concluding that officials can, in
some circumstances, be denied immunity for such acts); Cassese, supra note 90, at 869
(rejecting the distinction between private capacity and official capacity, but calling for
denial of immunity for international crimes).
98.
See, e.g., Bradley & Helfer, supra note 65, at 42.
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Regardless of the terminology employed, the logical, nonfictional
approach is to recognize that both the abstract entity of the state and
the officials who commit the acts are responsible for egregious human
rights violations even if the legal consequences of that responsibility
may differ.

VI. CONCLUSION
The rules determining when foreign states or their current or
former officials should be granted immunity represent policies
adopted by states over many decades and subject to reassessment and
revision in response to changes in international law. Disagreements
about immunity for the officials who commit abuses in the exercise of
governmental authority are based not on logical constructs but on
those policy choices. While immunity furthers orderly international
relations, it also blocks accountability and denies redress to those
injured by egregious human rights violations. When officials violate
core international human rights norms, neither history nor logic
requires that immunity protect them.

